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Abstract. In multi-agent environments in which coordination is desirable, the history of play often causes
lock-in at sub-optimal outcomes. Notoriously, technologies with a significant environmental footprint or
high social cost persist despite the successful development of more environmentally friendly and/or socially
efficient alternatives. The displacement of the status quo is hindered by entrenched economic interests and
network effects. To exacerbate matters, the standard mechanism design approaches based on centralized
authorities with the capacity to use preferential subsidies to effectively dictate system outcomes are not
always applicable to modern decentralized economies. What other types of mechanisms are feasible?
In this paper, we develop and analyze a mechanism that induces transitions from inefficient lock-ins to
superior alternatives. This mechanism does not exogenously favor one option over another – instead, the
phase transition emerges endogenously via a standard evolutionary learning model, Q-learning, where
agents trade-off exploration and exploitation. Exerting the same transient influence to both the efficient and
inefficient technologies encourages exploration and results in irreversible phase transitions and permanent
stabilization of the efficient one. On a technical level, our work is based on bifurcation and catastrophe
theory, a branch of mathematics that deals with changes in the number and stability properties of equilibria.
Critically, our analysis is shown to be structurally robust to significant and even adversarially chosen
perturbations to the parameters of both our game and our behavioral model.
Keywords: Mechanism Design · Catastrophe Theory · Bifurcations · Equilibrium Selection · Q-learning ·
Population Games · Lock-in.
1 Introduction
Efficient and sustainable innovations often fail to reach the critical mass of adoption that is needed
to supersede socially harmful and energy-wasteful status-quo technologies [49,42,15] due to positive
network effects and lock-in costs [38]. This frequently observed deadlock, termed inefficient lock-in
[40], is a recurrent theme in the economics literature. Recent (technological) examples include the
transportation sector — where the existing infrastructure (network effect) for CO2 emitting vehicles
hinders or, at least, slows down the adoption of greener alternatives (e.g., platooning systems, electric
cars or aircrafts powered by renewable energy) — updates in the Internet’s infrastructure — e.g., the
long-anticipated transition from IPV4 to IPV6, a problem also known as protocol ossification, and,
notoriously, Proof of Work mining, a setting that has attracted widespread attention by academics,
entrepreneurs and policymakers [21,25].1
While this issue is not entirely new, [3,17,58], both experimental and theoretical studies suggest
that little is known about how to move out of a lock-in [18,35,30]. Surprisingly, in all these cases, the
challenge of transitioning to an existing alternative is primarily not technological but rather game-
theoretical in nature. Yet, game theory alone can only be used to understand whether a lock-in will
occur: since most standard solution concepts are invariant to the history of play, they cannot offer
Stefanos Leonardos and Georgios Piliouras gratefully acknowledge MOE AcRF Tier 2 Grant 2016-T2-1-170. Geor-
gios Piliouras also acknowledges grant PIE-SGP-AI-2018-01, NRF2019-NRF-ANR095 ALIAS grant and NRF 2018
Fellowship NRF-NRFF2018-07.
1 Manifestations of this phenomenon are prevalent across the whole spectrum of social, economic, political, and natural
sciences: persistence of bad social norms [59], inefficient business practices and procedures [52,40], fierce market
competition over supply and demand of products and services (also known as “life-cycle competition”) [20,14,26],
community or committee voting in managerial boards [2,39], mood disorders [65], investments in undeveloped regions
with tourism potential [38] are only some of the numerous settings in which this problem is observed.
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much insight on whether such a lock-in can be overcome unless they are coupled with a proper
dynamic, behavioral model [8]. In this respect, the need to develop a suitable behavioral model that
will combine adaptive learning with strategic behavior and which will be suitable to make predictions
in games with a history of lock-in has been receiving increasing attention [40].
In this paper, we address this problem from the perspective of mechanism design and focus on
developing an economically feasible mechanism that will provably allow a central planner, or more
generally, an external authority with partial and only temporary influence over agents’ behavior, to
move the system out of the inefficient lock-in and lead it to a socially desirable outcome.
From a theoretical perspective, we stylize this situation as a coordination or evolutionary game
with multiple equilibria [20]. Accordingly, the population state (or equilibrium) in which the currently
prevailing, yet wasteful technology is used by all agents is evolutionary stable and small perturbations,
i.e., adopters of the alternative technology, are doomed to fail [43]. In turn, the externality that agents’
actions impose on the society is not quantified in their short term utility function and hence, does
not shape their current decisions. This creates a deadlock: a situation — among many known in
social and economic sciences — in which selfish behavior stands at odds with the social good. Yet,
mechanism design, the natural approach to attack this problem, is powerless in this setting. The
inherently decentralized nature of contemporary economies and social interactions raises challenges
that severely lessen the applicability of off-the-shelf solutions. The reasons are well-rooted in the
structure of large population networks (that represent today’s transborder societies) and the behavioral
patterns of the participating agents.
Specifically, mechanisms that consistently subsidize socially beneficial behavior are not econom-
ically feasible and would be subject to gaming in the long run. Even more of a showstopper is the fact
that many top-down policies that treat differentially one option versus another have been shown to be
rather hard, if not outright impossible, to sustain in practice or have frequently failed to offset users’
potential losses from prevailing network effects. More importantly, standard expected utility models,
the bedrock of classic mechanism design, are arguably too simplistic to model agents’ behavior in
practice for several reasons: hedging against volatility or extreme events, risk attitudes, collusions,
politics/governance, to name but a few. It would thus be important to develop solutions that are robust
to more complex behavioral assumptions.
Ourmodel: To address this problem,we introduce an evolutionary game-theoreticmodel that captures
agent behavior in decentralized systems with network effects. The agents’ strategic interaction is
stylized as a population game whose state updates are governed by a revision protocol that balances
exploitation (expected utility maximization) and exploration of suboptimal alternatives (hedging)
[29]. These two elements generate an evolutionary dynamic that can then be used to reason about
agents’ decision making in this setting [54].
The advantage of having both a game-theoretic model (Section 2) as well as learning-theoretic
model (Section 3) is that it allows us to formally argue about the stability of the equilibria of the game.
For example, in the simplest possible game-theoretic model of competition between a prevalent, yet
wasteful technology (W) and a more efficient (both socially and individually) alternative (S), we have
that the utility of using the W (respectively S) strategy increases linearly in the number of other
agents that are using the same technology. This results in three types of fixed points: everyone using
W , everyone using S, and a “mixed” population case at the exact split where both technologies are
equally desirable/profitable. Intuitively, this mixed state is an unstable equilibrium as a slight increase
of the fraction ofW (respectively S) adopters is enough to break ties and encourage convergence to a
monomorphic state. However, to make this discussion concrete, we need to formally describe how a
mixed population state (i.e., theW/S split) evolves over time.
To model the adaptive behavior of the agents, we use the Boltzmann Q-learning dynamics [66,61]
(one of themost well-knownmodels of evolutionary reinforcement learning that can also be derived as
a limit of the well known Experience-Weighted Attraction behavioral game theory model [12,13,23]).
The decision of each agent, or equivalently of each unit of investment, is whether to adopt technology
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W or technology S given that x ∈ [0, 1] fraction of the population adopts technology W . According
to the Q-learning behavioral model, the agents update their actions by keeping track of the collective
past performance — in particular, of a properly defined Q-score — of their available strategies (W
and S). Roughly (see Section 2 for the formal specifications and notation), if we denote with u (W, x)
and u (S, x) the utility of an investment unit from either of the two technologies W and S when the
state of the population is (x, 1 − x), with x ∈ [0, 1] denoting the fraction of W investments, then the
Q-learning dynamics are given by the following scheme
Ûx = x[u (W, x) − u (S, x)︸                ︷︷                ︸
Replicator Dynamics
−T · (x ln x + (1 − x) ln (1 − x))︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Entropy
] . (1)
In a far-reaching twist, each agent’s utility function is enhanced by an entropy term that is weighted
by a parameter T , termed temperature or rationality. When T = 0, the dynamics are precisely the
replicator dynamics [54,47,7] and they recover theNash equilibria of the game, whereas large values of
T lead to uniform randomization between the available options. Informally, low temperatures capture
cool-headed agents that focus primarily on strategies with good historical performance, whereas high
temperatures favor hedging and exploration.
This interpretation suggests that T is a behavioral attribute of the population which cannot be
influenced by an external authority. However, from equation (1), it can be seen that the application of
a tax-rate (or any other mechanism) to rescale agents’ utilities, is essentially equivalent to a change
in parameter T , i.e., to a change in the agents’ rationality [67,68]. This is precisely the intuition that
we exploit here to prompt the transition from the evolutionary stable, yet inefficient, equilibrium of
the locked-in technologyW (cf. Proposition 1) to the adoption of the desirable technology S.
Our solution: Catastrophe Design. Our main contribution is to formally prove that there exists a sim-
ple, robust, and transient catastrophe-based mechanism to destabilize theW equilibrium and enforce
the S equilibrium. The proposed mechanism, while simple to implement, has provable guarantees
that critically exploit the complex underlying geometric structure of the Q-learning dynamics, cf.
Section 4. As a first step in the process, we provide a complete characterization of both the number
as well as the stability of the equilibria of the Q-learning dynamics, also known as Quantal Response
Equilibria (QRE) [41], given game-theoretic models ofW/S competition for all values of T (Theorem
1). This is a question of independent interest as it explores the possible limit system behaviors in the
lack of any controlling mechanism.
Then, we describe how by simply raising taxation/temperature up to (slightly beyond) a critical
value and then reducing it down to zero results into convergence to the socially optimal S equilibrium
(Theorem 2). The mechanism is formally described in Section 5. Here, we provide an informal
statement for the reader’s convenience.
Theorem (Informal statement of Theorem 2). For any initial population state, there exists a finite
sequence of control variable levels T = 〈T0 = 0,T1, . . . ,Tn = 0〉 such that through the following
procedure:
– scale the control variable to Ti, and
– wait until the system converges to a QRE
the system is going to converge to the desirable state x = 0, which corresponds to the energy-friendly
technology S. In particular, the sequence of control levels starts from T0 = 0 (no control), increases
temporarily above a critical level and is reset back to Tn = 0.
Our approach is based on the combination of two observations which can be visualized in Figure 1
(cf. Figure 4): First, the number and stability of equilibria (QRE) of the Q-learning dynamics are a
function of T , i.e., of the trade-off level between exploration and exploitation. For T = 0, there exist
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Fig. 1: Visualization of the QRE surface projected in time (right horizontal axis) and the transition
from the prevailing wasteful technology (W) to the efficient technology (S) via an induced catastrophe.
At phase 1, all resources are invested inW , and the control parameter is at 0. As the control parameter
increases, the population moves along the red line on the QRE surface. At phase 2, the control
parameter reaches the critical value or tipping point at which the two upper QRE merge into one and
at the very next moment, phase 3, at which the parameter T is increased slightly above the critical
level, the system undergoes an abrupt transition at which the upper QRE vanishes. Between these
two successive time points, the population state changes from 69% of investment in W right before
the catastrophe to only 15% immediately after. After this point, the control parameter is reset to 0,
and due to the resulting hysteresis effect [50], the population converges to the new equilibrium which
corresponds to the adoption of the (new) technology S.
three QRE, which are precisely the three described Nash equilibria. For slightly larger T > 0, we
still have three QRE, but now due to the exploration term, all three lie in the interior of the interval
(0, 1). Finally, beyond some critical level of the control parameter, the number of QRE drops from
three to one. In particular, at this critical level, the prevailing equilibrium fuses with the unstable
mixed equilibrium and at the very next moment, the now merged equilibria, cancel each other out at
a phenomenon known as saddle-node bifurcation or catastrophe [60,34].
The second observation is that we can effectively control parameter T (e.g., increase it by a
multiplicative scale α), since it is mathematically equivalent to scaling down the utility of the agents
by the same factor α (up to time reparameterization in equation 1). In policy terms, this can be
interpreted as taxation of income (i.e., a multiplicative decrease of payoffs for all actions), which
results in agent behavior that is less stringent about maximizing earnings at all costs. Informally and
taking this idea to its logical extreme, a taxation level of 99% (i.e., a very large T) would effectively
render the agents indifferent about payoffs and make them choose actions at random.
Putting these two observations together, by controlling T , we can control the resulting QRE and,
thus, the resulting state of the system over time.More critically, when exceeding the critical level of the
control parameter (tipping point), a phase transition or catastrophe occurs at which the state behavior
changes abruptly (phases 2 and 3 in Figure 1). This is the critical step that disrupts the prevalent
outcome and encodes a new memory to the system that moves the population into the attracting
region of the desirable equilibrium. At this point, the level of adoption of the new technology, or
critical mass, is typically well below the simple majority (50%). Finally, we leverage (in principle at
least) this saddle-node bifurcation (which eliminates the inefficient equilibria) to create irreversible
phase transitions such that even when the controlling parameter T returns to its initial state T = 0,
the state of the system is not the original undesirable stable state (x = 1), but the target S state, x = 0
(phase 4 in Figure 1).
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Robustness of findings. Critically, we stress-test our findings and establish that they are robust to
modeling uncertainty/misspecifications across different axes, cf. Appendix A. In Appendix A.1, we
allow (possibly adversarial) uncertainty/perturbations in the dynamics and the population game-
theoretical model. For the reader’s convenience, our main result is restated in the following Theorem.
Theorem (Informal statement of Theorem 3). Under state-dependent, bounded perturbations in the
evolution of the Q-learning dynamics, the proposed catastrophe mechanism yields a transition from
the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium with the only difference that the population stabilizes at
some neighborhood of the QRE of the unperturbed system in the intermediate phases.
In Appendix A.2, we explore utility functions that capture strong superadditive effects on network
valuation. These models introduce significant difficulties as lie outside the typical framework of
evolutionary game theory with multi-linear utility functions. Again, our main result is informally
stated below.
Theorem (Informal statement of Theorem 4). For positive network effects of arbitrary intensity, i.e.,
for arbitrary non-linear payoff functions that yield superadditive value in the degree of adoption, the
proposed catastrophe mechanism yields a transition from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium.
The findings of the robustness analysis justify the selection of our baseline modeling assumptions
with an eye towards simplicity primarily for expositional purposes. In short, the main takeaway from
the two robustness theorems is that our results can be directly extended for a wide range of modeling
designs and approaches. Technically, while the number of equilibria and the stability properties of
the dynamics may change under these perturbed conditions, the resulting control mechanism can be
applied without any significant changes.
Other related work. While applications of catastrophe theory in the field of economics have received
mixed reactions in the past, not least due to their original hype [51], the formal connections between
bifurcations, hysteresis effects, and coordination games have started to gain increasing attention
[63,31,50]. The idea of leveraging these complex dynamics in the arsenal of mechanism design has
been only recently proposed [67,68], yet its formal treatment remains unexplored. Applying these
concepts in a real options setting and bringing forth theoretically provable properties concerning a
market’s network effects and the adoption rate of competing technologies, our work extends previous
studies that identify and reason about these connections mainly via experiments [5,38,9,59]. Further
supporting the scarcity of a formal approach, [4] emphasizes the increasing complexity of economic
and social interactions and argues about the need to join forces and develop tools from complexity the-
ory, as a complement to existing economic modeling approaches. Focusing on physical applications,
the main field where catastrophe theory is studied, [57] uses the fold catastrophe model to identify
early warning signs of critical transitions in complex systems. In relation to mechanism design, such
results can amplify the benefits of the catastrophe model as a tool to create, rather than prevent, critical
transitions in the hands of policymakers who can, thus, timely predict the effects of their policies.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we provide the formal
definitions of the game-theoretical and behavior framework. Our working assumptions (which we
relax in Appendix A) are presented in Section 2.1. Section 4 contains the technical work up to the
design of themain catastrophemechanism that is presented and explained in Section 5. InAppendixA,
we establish the robustness of the proposedmechanism under a broad set of assumptions.We conclude
with an illustrative application in the context of blockchain mining in Appendix B. Technical proofs
and accompanying materials are deferred to Appendices C and D.
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2 Model: Population Game
We consider a society or population2 p of acting agents or investors who form a continuum of
mass K > 0. Here K denotes the total available capital or resources that the agents are willing to
invest and is expressed in monetary terms. The set of available actions or technologies is denoted
by A = {W, S}, where W is the costly (wasteful) technology and S is the innovative (socially and
individually preferable) technology. In particular, investing one monetary unit in technologyW incurs
a cost of γ > 0 to the investor, while the investment in technology S incurs zero cost. The latter
assumption ensures that (rational) agents may disregard potential alternatives and invest all available
resources on either of the two technologies (there is no loss from doing so). Accordingly, the set of
population states is X = {(x, 1 − x) : x ∈ [0, 1]}, where x ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of agents (in
terms of capital or resources) in population p that is choosing technologyW . Thus, we may slightly
abuse notation and refer to x ∈ [0, 1] as the population state.
The payoff function, u : A× X → R2, assigns to each population state a vector of payoffs, one for
each strategy in A. We assume that the total value created by each technology {W, S} in A depends
on the fraction xK of capital that has been invested in that technology via a parameter α > 0 and
that the total value is distributed evenly among all invested units. We assume that either technology
can generate an aggregate value V > K , if fully adopted by the population. In particular, the values
V (W, x) and V (S, x) created by technologies W and S depend on the population state x ∈ [0, 1] via
the relationships
V (W, x) = V · (xK)α and V (S, x) = V · [(1 − x)K]α . (2)
Different values of α give rise to different network effects or externalities.3 In particular, α < 1
implies subadditive value (it is optimal for the population to split), α = 1 implies linear value, and
α > 1 implies superadditive value, i.e., the population is better off if it fully adopts either of the two
technologies. Combining the above, the payoff of each strategy {W, S} ∈ A is given by
u (W, x) = V (W, x) · 1
xK
− γ = V · (xK)
α
xK
− γ = V · (xK)α−1 − γ (3a)
u (S, x) = V (S, x) · 1(1 − x)K = V ·
[(1 − x)K]α
xK
= V · [(1 − x)K]α−1 (3b)
Hence, the average payoff obtained by the members of the population at state x ∈ [0, 1] is equal to
u¯ (x) = xu (W, x) + (1 − x) u (S, x) = VKα−1
[
xα − γx
VKα−1
+ (1 − x)α
]
(4)
and the aggregate payoff that is achieved by the population as a whole is uA (x) = Ku¯ (x). The cost
Kγx is paid by the population as a whole and hence, captures the negative externality (or cost) of the
undesirable technology.
2.1 Evolutionary Game and Nash Equilibria
To study instances with positive network externalities (or direct network effects [38]) in which full
adoption of one of the technologies is preferable, our main focus will be the case α ≥ 1. For
expositional purposes, we will restrict our attention to the case α = 2, but all arguments essentially
carry over to any α > 1 (and to the trivial case, α = 1) as we show in Appendix A.2. Specifically, for
α = 2, eqs. (3) and (4) become linear in x,
u (W, x) = VKx − γ, u (S, x) = VK (1 − x) (5)
2 The theory of population games and revision protocols that we use here closely follows [54].
3 This is discussed in more detail in Remark 6.
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which allows for an equivalent — yet more intuitive — interpretation of the agents’ interaction as
a single population evolutionary game, cf. [28]. By substituting x = 1 (action W for the whole
population) and x = 0 (action S) in (5), we can represent the game by the matrix
P =
( W S
W VK − γ −γ
S 0 VK
)
. (G1)
Since V > K > γ > 0, we may henceforth normalize VK to 1 and write γ → γ/VK with γ ∈ (0, 1).
The equilibria of the resulting game are characterized next. The proof is standard and is presented for
completeness in Appendix C.
Proposition 1. The payoff functions in (5) describe a single population, evolutionary game with
three Nash equilibria: x1 = 0, x2 = (1 + γ) /2 and x3 = 1 with average payoffs u¯ (x1) = 1, u¯ (x2) =
(1 − γ) /2 and u¯ (x3) = 1 − γ. The two pure equilibria, x1 = 0 and x3 = 1 are evolutionary stable,
while the fully mixed equilibrium, x2, is not. Equilibrium x1 – in which the desirable technology is
fully adopted – is strictly payoff and risk dominant.
This formulation provides a theoretical explanation of the reasons why the more efficient technol-
ogymay not succeed. In particular, starting from the prevailing equilibrium of thewasteful technology,
evolutionary stability implies that even if a small part of the population adopts the new technology, the
system will not move away from the current equilibrium. Hence, although payoff and risk-dominated
by the more efficient technology, the W (or equivalently x = 1) equilibrium persists. This creates
the lock-in at the wasteful technology. To formally reason about potential mechanisms to disrupt this
situation, we first need to develop a proper adaptive learning model that accurately describes the
updates of the population states.
3 Behavioral Model
The adoption of new technologies is a gradual process at which concerned individuals adjust their
actions— distribution of their investments between old and new technologies— via repeated interac-
tion with their environment. In the presence of network effects, each agent’s payoff critically depends
on the constantly evolving population state or equivalently on the fractions x, 1 − x of the population
that adopts either of the two technologies, cf. equation (3). In this context, [54] provides several
alternative microfoundations of the standard replicator dynamics under the term revision protocols.
To improve upon the sub-optimal outcomes that are often reached by the greedy and myopic
updates of replicator dynamics [22] and, importantly, to more accurately model agent’s strategic
deviations from expected utility maximization in risky choices under uncertainty (as in the present
context), more elaborate models of adaptive learning have been proposed [12,13]. Specifically, the
effects of exploration and exploitation in coordination games with path-dependence (history of play)
and network effects, are commonly examined via a smooth variant of Q-learning dynamics.4. Its
connection with game-theoretical settings has been recently elaborated [63,56,55,67,31] and provides
the building block for our subsequent analysis.
3.1 Population States with Q-learning Dynamics
We consider a homogeneous population in which each agent is adapting their strategy by repeatedly
interacting with their environment (rest of the population). The critical parameter that we need to
4 This variant of Q-learning has been extensively studied in the related literature under various names. A (highly) non-
exhaustive list includes [37,62,31] and [67] who study the dynamics as Boltzmann Q-learning dynamics or simply
Q-learning dynamics — we will follow this convention — [1,50] and [53] as logit-response and [16,44] as exponential
reinforcement learning dynamics.
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track (and update) is the fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of the population that invests in the costly (and currently
prevailing) technology W . To do this, we focus on the standpoint of a single agent (or unit of
investment) and describe the system via the Q-learning dynamics which are based on the principle
of Q-learning [66,12]. The connection to population games that is described here closely follows
[63,31] and [68] without further reference.
Q-values: At each time t ≥ 0, the learning agent assigns a valueQt ( j) to each strategy j ∈ A = {W, S}
via the update rule
Qt+1 ( j) = Qt ( j) + δ [u ( j, xt ) −Qt ( j)] (6)
where δ > 0 is the learning rate and u ( j, xt ) is the reward from selecting strategy j ∈ {W, S} (as
given by equations (3)) when the distribution of the population is xt ∈ [0, 1].
Strategies & Population States: Using the Q-values, the critical decision for each learning agent is
the update of her choice distribution. To avoid suboptimal results by greedy updating, i.e., selection
of the strategy with the highest Q-value, the agents incorporate in their decision problem an entropy
term that rewards exploration of the whole action space (both technologies). In particular, we assume
that each agent selects their strategy xt ∈ [0, 1] at time point t ≥ 0 as the (unique) solution of the
convex optimization problem5
xt = arg max
x∈(0,1)
{xQt (W) + (1 − x)Qt (S) − T [x ln x + (1 − x) ln (1 − x)]} (S1)
where T ≥ 0 is the control parameter that tunes the exploration rate. In particular, for T = 0,
the agent selects the action with the highest Q-value (pure exploitation), whereas for T → ∞, the
agent randomizes between the two available actions, i.e., investments in technologiesW and S (pure
exploration). The decision rule or revision protocol [54] in (S1) yields the choice distribution
xt =
eQt (W )/T
eQt (W )/T + eQt (S)/T
(7)
which is known as the Boltzmann distribution. With a slight abuse of notation, xt denotes both the
learning agents’ choice distribution and the state of the population. However, under the assumption
that all agents are symmetric and that they are learning concurrently, both these notions are equivalent.
Continuous-time dynamics: The population game in (G1), together with the revision protocol in
(S1), determine the evolutionary population dynamics. In particular, if we take the time interval to be
infinitely small, this sequential joint learning process can be well approximated — after rescaling the
time horizon to t → δt/T — by the continuous-time dynamics
Ûx = x
u (W, x) − u¯ (x) + T
∑
j=W,S
xj ln
(
xj/x
) (8)
(where xW := x and xS := 1 − x), which is the desired expression of the dynamics in terms of
population states x ∈ [0, 1] (rather than Q-values).
Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE): For any given T ≥ 0, the steady states of the system in (8) are
the values of x ∈ (0, 1) for which the expression on the right side becomes zero. As shown in [31],
these are precisely the Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) of the underlying population game [41].
Assuming the standard logit form, for any T ≥ 0, the QRE are defined as all points x∗ (T) ∈ [0, 1] that
satisfy the equation
x∗ (T) = e
u(W,x∗)/T
eu(W,x∗)/T + eu(S,x∗)/T
. (9)
5 For an explicit derivation of the objective function see Appendix C.
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Importantly, as shown in [68], in coordination games with 2 strategies, starting from any interior
point6 x ∈ (0, 1), the Q-learning dynamics converge to interior rest points (QRE) for any T ≥ 0.
4 Analysis: Steady Population States
Our main task is to understand how an external designer can influence the state of the population, i.e.,
the distribution of the aggregate investment capital across the two different technologies, bymodifying
the control parameter T ≥ 0. Before formally discussing the proposed mechanism in Section 5, we
first need to reason about the solutions (steady states) and stability properties of the dynamics in
equation (8) for all different values of the control parameter T ≥ 0. We start with an observation that
immediately follows from (3) and (8)
Lemma 1. For a given cost parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), consider the game described by equation (G1),
and the revision protocol in (S1). Then, the updates in the fraction of investments on the wasteful
technologyW , i.e., population state x ∈ [0, 1], are governed by the continuous-time dynamics
Ûx = x (1 − x)
[
2x − (1 + γ) − T ln
( x
1 − x
)]
. (10)
for any value T ≥ 0 of the control parameter.
When determining the steady states (QRE) and stability properties of equation (10) for different
T ≥ 0, it is more intuitive to treat the instance T = 0 separately. In this case, the system reduces
to the well-known replicator dynamics, and its steady states are precisely the Nash equilibria of the
respective evolutionary game in (G1).
Concerning stability, the one-dimensional differential equation in (10) describes a vector field
on the line and specifies the velocity vector Ûx at each x ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, a fixed point, i.e., a
x0 ∈ [0, 1] such that Ûx0 = 0, is stable if the flow points towards it, i.e., if Ûx > 0 for any x < x0 and
Ûx < 0 for any x > x0 such that |x − x0 | <  for some  > 0, i.e., the property needs to be satisfied in
a (strictly positive) neighborhood around x0. The neighborhood of x0 for which this holds is called
its attracting region [47]. If such an attracting region does not exist, the fixed point is called unstable
[60].
Proposition 2. For T = 0, the steady states of the Q-learning dynamics in equation (10) are x1 =
0, x2 = (1 + γ) /2, and x3 = 1. The steady states on the boundary, i.e., x1 and x3, are stable, whereas
x2 is unstable.
Proof. For T = 0, the dynamics become Ûx = x (1 − x) (2x − 1 − γ) and the first claim follows
trivially. Concerning their stability, observe that Ûx < 0 for any x ∈ (0, (1 + γ) /2) and Ûx > 0 for
x ∈ ((1 + γ) /2, 1). Hence, starting from any point other than x = (1 + γ) /2, the system will converge
to the boundary steady states, i.e, to x1 = 0 for any initial starting point x < x2 and to x3 = 1 for any
initial starting point x > x2, which completes the proof.
The steady states and their stability properties for T = 0 are illustrated in Figure 3a. To proceed
with the general case, T > 0, we restrict to interior population states, i.e., x ∈ (0, 1), so that
ln (x/(1 − x)) is well defined. For x ∈ (0, 1), the term x (1 − x) is always strictly positive and hence,
the fixed points (QRE) and velocity of the dynamics in equation (10) are fully determined by the term
[2x − (1 + γ) − T ln (x/(1 − x))]. Hence, it will be convenient to introduce the following notation.
6 The introduction of the exploitation term renders the choices x = 0 and x = 1 not admissible, since they are not in the
domain of ln (x/(1 − x)) for any T > 0. However, for practical applications, this is a realistic assumption.
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Notation 1. For given cost and control parameters, γ ∈ (0, 1) and T ≥ 0, let
f (x;T, γ) := 2x − (1 + γ) − T ln
( x
1 − x
)
, for x ∈ (0, 1). (11)
Whenever obvious from the context, we will simplify notation and write f (x).
Keeping in mind that T is viewed as a control parameter that may vary over time (in response to
the actions of some exogenous actor), a two-dimensional visualization of the geometric locus of all
points x∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that f (x;T, γ) = 0 — i.e., of the QRE correspondence — for selected fixed
values of γ and variable T ≥ 0 is given in Figure 2a. Figure 2b shows the QRE correspondence in a
three-dimensional space — where both γ and T are treated as variables — and Figure 2c shows its
projection on the cost-control, (γ,T), parameter space.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: Figure 2a shows the QRE correspondence (geometric locus of QRE) for γ = 0.02 (blue line),
γ = 0.2 (red line), and γ = 0.8 (green line). In all cases, there exists a critical value Tc (γ), which
determines the range of values of T ≥ 0 for which there are three, two, or one QRE. Dashed lines
indicate unstable QRE; see Theorem 1.
Figure 2b shows the QRE correspondence for all possible values of γ ∈ (0, 1). The (T, x∗)-slices at
the γ = 0.02, 0.2, and 0.8 levels correspond precisely to the blue, red, and green lines in Figure 2a.
Figure 2c shows the projection of theQREcorrespondence on the (γ,T) plane.Darker areas correspond
to parameter valueswithmultiple (three)QRE. The critical valuesTc (γ), at which the phase transitions
from one to three QRE occur, correspond to the middle boundary that separates the dark and light
regions.
4.1 Critical values of the control parameter
The main observation from Figure 2 is that for each γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique critical value,
Tc (γ) of the control parameter such that the number of steady states (QRE) depends on whether T is
less than, equal to or larger than Tc (γ). In particular, for T < Tc (γ), there exist three QRE, which for
T = 0 are precisely the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, for T = Tc (γ), i.e., at the transition
point, there exist two QRE, and for T > Tc (γ), there remains only one QRE. In all cases, the critical
temperature Tc lies in the interval (0, 1/2). These properties are formalized in Theorem 1. Before
proceeding with its statement, however, it will be convenient to introduce the following notation.
Notation 2. For anyT ∈ [0, 1/2], let xu,l (T) := 12
(
1 ± √1 − 2T
)
. Whenever obvious from the context,
we will omit the dependence on T and write xl,u.
Using the above, we can now formulate Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Steady states and stability of the Q-learning dynamics). For any value of the cost
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique critical value of the control parameter Tc (γ) with Tc (γ) ∈
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(0, 1/2), so that the steady states of the population or equivalently, the Quantal Response Equilibria
(QRE), of the continuous time Q-learning dynamics in (10)
Ûx = x (1 − x)
[
2x − (1 + γ) − T ln
( x
1 − x
)]
, x ∈ (0, 1) ,
and their stability properties are determined by the relative value of T in comparison to Tc (γ) as
follows
– for T < Tc (γ) there are 3 steady states x1, x2, x3, with x1 ∈ (0, xl), x2 ∈ ((1 + γ) /2, xu) and
x3 ∈ (xu, 1),
– for T = Tc (γ) there are 2 steady states x1, x2, with x1 ∈ (0, xl), and x2 = xu, and
– for T > Tc (γ) there is 1 steady state x1, with x1 ∈ (0, xl) when T < 1/2 and x1 ∈ (0, 1/2) when
T ≥ 1/2,
where xl,u are given in Notation 2 whenever they exist, with xl < 1/2 and xu > (1 + γ) /2. In all
cases, the steady state x1 ∈ (0, xl) is stable. For T < Tc (γ), steady states x1 ∈ (0, xl) and x3 ∈ (xu, 1)
are stable whereas x2 is not. In particular, for T = Tc (γ), steady state x2 = xu is unstable.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on Lemmas 2 and 3, for all of which the reader is deferred to
Appendix C.1. The case T = 0 which was separately treated in Proposition 2, can be derived as a
special case of the part T < Tc (γ) in Theorem 1, for which x1 = 0, x2 = (1 + γ) /2 and x3 = 1. The
stability considerations remain the same for the general case T > 0 and, as in Proposition 2, they are
fully determined by the sign of Ûx or equivalently, of f (x). Summing up, the statements of Theorem 1
and Proposition 2 are illustrated in Figure 3.
0x↓
x1
1/2
↓
x2 = (1 + γ) /2
↓
x3
1
−
←
+
→
0
Ûx
stable
0
unstable
0
stable
(a) T = 0.
0x
↓
x1
xl 1/2
↓
x2
xu
↓
x3
1
Ûx +
→
−
←
+
→
−
←
0
stable
0
unstable
0
stable(b) 0 < T < Tc (γ).
0x
↓
x1
xl 1/2
↓
x2
xu
1
Ûx +
→
−
←
−
←
0
stable
0
unstable(c) T = Tc (γ).
0x
↓
x1
1/2 1
+
→
−
←
0Ûx
stable
(d) T > Tc (γ)
Fig. 3: Stability properties of the Q-learning dynamics for all values ofT ≥ 0. The stability of a steady
state (QRE) x (upper axis) is determined by the sign of Ûx (lower axis). The number of QRE and hence,
the stability properties change before, at, and after the critical temperature Tc (γ), cf. Figure 2. The
case T = 0 (upper left panel) is a special case of 0 < T < Tc (γ) (upper right panel), for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
For 0 < T ≤ Tc (γ) (panels (b) and (c)), it holds that xu, x2 > (1 + γ) /2. A typical instantiation is
given in Figure 9 in Appendix C.1.
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Remark 1 (Location of QRE.). From Theorem 1, it follows that for any γ ∈ (0, 1), there are no QRE
in [1/2, (1 + γ) /2). Also, for any x < [1/2, (1 + γ) /2), there exists precisely one T ≥ 0 such that this
x is a QRE of (G1). To see this, we set f (x;T, γ) = 0 in (11) and solve for T as a function for x
T (x; γ) = (2x − 1 − γ) /ln
( x
1 − x
)
.
For any x ∈ [1/2, (1 + γ) /2), the expression on the right is negative, which implies that there exists
no T ≥ 0 so that this x is a QRE of (G1). For any other x ∈ (0, 1) \ [1/2, (1 + γ) /2), the expression
on the right is positive (or equal to zero for x = (1 + γ) /2) and yields a unique T ≥ 0 for which this
x is a QRE. The points x = 0 and x = 1 are QRE (equivalently Nash equilibria) for T = 0.
Finally, as can be seen in Figure 2b, the critical level Tc (γ) is lower for larger values of γ.
Intuitively, the control that needs to be exercised on the system to reach the tipping point at which
the number of QRE of the population changes, is lower for larger differences — as expressed by
parameter γ — between the costs of the two technologies. This intuitive property is formally shown
in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. The critical level Tc (γ) is decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 provide a static view — in terms of the control parameter T — of the
QRE and stability properties of the dynamical system in equation (10). From a mechanism design
perspective, we are interested in the behavior of the system as T varies according to the control of the
central planner. This is discussed next.
5 Catastrophe Design and Hysteresis Mechanism
Assuming that the population faces a lock-in at the inefficient state, x = 1, at which the wasteful and/or
costly technology is fully adopted, we can now leverage the stability properties of the behavioral
model (Q-learning dynamics) of Theorem 1, to design a mechanism that will allow the population to
overcome this lock-in and adopt the efficient technology, i.e., converge to the x = 0. The mechanism
is described next and visualized in Figure 4 (cf. Figure 1 in Section 1 and Figure 10 in Appendix C.1).
Alongwith the technical details that emerge along the way, themechanism is formalized in Theorem 2.
Phase 1: Lock-in for T = 0 and T < Tc (γ). Initially, the population rests at (or close to) the x = 1
equilibrium at which the whole population adopts the incumbent, wasteful technology. As the control
parameter T is gradually increased (but remains below the critical value Tc (γ)), the population
stabilizes in the interior QRE on the upper branch of the QRE correspondence (light color line). This
QRE is stable, and its attracting region is separated from the stable lower QRE by the unstable middle
equilibrium (cf. Figures 3a and 3b).
Phase 2: Saddle-node bifurcation at T = Tc (γ). AsT reaches (from below) the critical valueTc (γ),
the upper stable QRE and middle unstable QRE collide and amalgamate into a single, unstable
equilibrium, cf. Figure 3c. Intuitively, all this time, the mixed QRE served as a threshold between
the attracting regions of the two stable QRE. Hence, although unstable, its existence was critical for
the behavior of the system, and its amalgamation with the upper QRE has a critical impact on the
dynamics of the system. Together with phase 3, at which the unstable equilibrium is annihilated, this
creates a saddle-node bifurcation, fold bifurcation, or fold catastrophe in the population dynamics
[60,34].
Phase 3: Annihilation of the inefficient QRE for T > Tc (γ). The critical phase transition occurs
when the control parameter exceeds (even marginally) the critical level Tc (γ). The population moves
from a QRE with fraction x > (1 + γ) /2 ofW adopters prior to the saddle-node bifurcation to a QRE
with x < 1/2 immediately after the bifurcation. At this point, the unstable QRE that was generated
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Fig. 4: Visualization of the combined catastrophe mechanism and hysteresis effect that move the
population out of the lock-in on the inefficient technologyW to the efficient technology S. The QRE
surface is projected in time, and the path of the population is depicted by starting from a lighter and
gradually moving to darker tones. The phases are described in detail in Section 5.
by the amalgamation of the two upper QRE vanishes, and for any larger value of T , the system has
only one QRE, which is the single attracting state of the population dynamics (cf. Figure 3d). The
bifurcation that annihilates the amalgamated QRE and the subsequent stabilization of the dynamics
in the single remaining QRE is the critical change of the system. In response to a small change in the
control parameter (from below to slightly above the critical level), the population moves (abruptly)
out of a state (QRE) in the attracting region of the inefficient equilibrium x = 1 to a QRE in the
attracting region of the efficient equilibrium x = 0 for T = 0.
Phase 4: Hysteresis effect as T → 0. The (permanent) impact of the bifurcation on the population
dynamics is that (the bifurcation) encodes a newmemory to the population. In particular, as explained
in the previous phase, for any value of T > Tc (γ), the system stabilizes at a QRE with fraction
x < 1/2 ofW adopters. Consequently, using this QRE as a starting point and reducing (gradually or
even instantaneously) the control parameter T back to 0, the system provably converges to the efficient
equilibrium, i.e., to the adoption of the efficient technology. This creates a hysteresis effect: when the
control parameter T is back to its initial level, i.e., T = 0, at which no exogenous control is exercised
to the system, the population equilibrates at a different state than its initial one.
The above mechanism, termed catastrophe mechanism, is formalized in Theorem 2, whose proof
is given in Appendix C.1. Theorem 2 is stated for initial conditions x0 ∈ [(1 + γ) /2, 1], i.e., for initial
conditions that capture the lock-in at the inefficient technology. For x0 ∈ [0, (1 + γ) /2) convergence
to the x = 0 equilibrium is trivial.
Theorem 2 (Catastrophe mechanism.). For a fixed cost parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) consider the popula-
tion game (G1) and the revision protocol (S1), which together lead to the population evolutionary
dynamics Ûx in (10). Then, for any initial population state x0 ∈ [(1 + γ) /2, 1], there exists a finite
sequence 〈T0,T1, . . . ,Tn〉 of control parameter values with T0 = Tn = 0, and maxi≤n Ti > Tc (γ), so
that the iterative procedure which, starting from phase i = 0,
– scales the control parameter T to Ti,
– allows the system to converge to a QRE, x∗ (Ti),
and reiterates for phase i + 1, generates a sequence of population states (QRE) that converges to the
risk-dominant equilibrium, x∗ (Tn) = 0, at which the population adopts the efficient technology.
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Remark 2. In theory, it suffices to use the sequence 〈T0 = 0,T1 > Tc (γ) ,Tn = 0〉. However, for
practical applications, such abrupt changes of the control parameter T may not be possible. For
instance, if T denotes a tax or temperature parameter, then only gradual or smooth changes in T may
be permissible. In such cases, the sequence 〈T0,T1, . . . ,Tn〉 may require additional steps, but as long
as it satisfies the requirements of Theorem 2, the final outcome of the catastrophe mechanism still
obtains.
Properties and Practical Implementation From the above, it is immediate that the proposed mech-
anism has two desirable properties for practical applications. First, the critical population mass,
x∗ (Tc (γ)), i.e., the fraction of adopters of the wasteful technology at the critical level Tc (γ), is
strictly larger than the mixed equilibrium (1 + γ) /2 of the initial game. This means that, under the
proposed mechanism, the bifurcation occurs when the wasteful technology is still adopted by the
majority of the population. The deviation to the new technology by a minority of the population is
sufficient to trigger the adoption of the new technology by the whole population and become per-
manent. Indicatively, in the depicted scenario of Figure 4, the population transitions from 69% of
W adopters immediately before the saddle-node bifurcation (or catastrophe) to 15% of W adopters
immediately after.
Second, and more importantly, from a social planner’s perspective, the required influence on the
control parameter needs to be only temporary. Yet, due to the resulting hysteresis, the effects of the
mechanism are permanent. Assuming that the exercise of any influence on the system incurs a cost,
this provides a desirable trade-off between the resources (expenses/time) of implementing such a
mechanism and the duration of its impact.
Finally, related to the previous property is also the interpretation of the initial normalization ofVK
to 1, cf. equation (10), in monetary terms. Since this normalization is equivalent to dividing equation
(8) with VK , all instances of γ and T in the previous analysis should be interpreted as γ/VK and
T/VK , respectively, for practical purposes. For instance, the threshold Tc (γ) < 1/2 for any γ (0, 1) in
Theorem 1 implies that in applications with VK , 1 (typically VK  1), the tipping point satisfies
Tc < VK/2. An illustrative application of this mechanism at which T is interpreted as taxation is
presented in Appendix B.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed and studied a mechanism to destabilize lock-in at inefficient equilibria
in (population) coordination games. While requiring only temporary influence to the population
with limited implementation costs, the proposed mechanism achieves a permanent transition from a
sub-optimal locked-in equilibrium state, e.g., the adoption of a status quo, yet wasteful technology,
to a socially and individually preferable state, e.g., the adoption of an innovative and sustainable
technology. As a first step, our methods expose the geometric features of the Q-learning dynamics
in the widely studied model of population games. The transition from the inefficient to the efficient
equilibrium is then achieved via an induced saddle-node bifurcation or controlled catastrophe in the
learning dynamics. The resulting mechanism is both simple to understand and easy to implement, yet
its provable guarantees make critical use of the complex underlying geometry.
The lock-in at inefficient equilibria is a long-standing problemwith amplemanifestations across the
whole spectrum of economic, social, natural, and behavioral sciences. However, little is known on how
to overcome the lock-in in practical applications. Most existing studies report experimental findings
[8,9,39] (and references therein) with only a few recent exceptions [68,40]. As economies and social
interactions become increasingly complex and unpredictable, the design of effective mechanisms,
even in purely adversarial conditions (limited resources and ability to control the population), is
more relevant than ever. Aiming to make progress in this direction, our work provides a (first to our
knowledge) provably efficient mechanism to overcome this lock-in and opens several directions for
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future work. Some of the most naturally arising questions concern the implementation of the current
mechanism— or modifications thereof — in adversarial settings at which the population can control
some parameter in response to changes in the control parameter T (here that would be parameter γ)
or under modified behavioral models. Testing the efficiency of the proposed mechanism in field or
laboratory experiments is another promising direction for study.
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A Structural Robustness of the Model
Thus far, our analysis and the proposed mechanism to move out of the inefficient lock-in rested on two
(seemingly) restrictive assumptions. The first is that the updates in the population state are not subject
to uncontrolled perturbations and the second is that α = 2, i.e., that the parameter which expresses
the intensity of network effects is such that the system can be represented as an evolutionary game,
cf. Section 2.1. For practical purposes and more generally for systems with constantly changing or
unknown characteristics, it is important to show that the efficiency of the suggested mechanism is not
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tied to these particular assumptions. It turns out that this indeed turn and our goal in this section is to
test and prove this claim in two directions.
First, we show that the proposedmechanismcontinues to apply under state dependent perturbations
in the Q-learning dynamics without significant impact in its actual implementation, cf. Appendix A.1.
This holds for any reasonably – in the sense that the model parameters remain in their admissible
regions – bounded perturbations.
Second, we study the robustness of themodel for network effects of different intensity, as expressed
by different values of parameter α, cf. Equation (2). In this direction, we obtain a conservative (yet
tight for extreme values of the parameters) theoretical bound on the critical value Tc (γ), i.e., on the
control that needs to be exercised to the system to trigger the desired transition out of the attracting
region of the initial technology. In practical terms, as α increases, a network split becomes more
damaging and the population reaches the tipping point for increasingly lower values of Tc. In this
respect, the case α = 2 that we treated in the previous part is one of the costliest to destabilize. Finally,
even though the number of QRE in the attracting region of the efficient technology may change for
large values of α, the mechanics of the proposed mechanism essentially remain unaffected.
A.1 State Dependent Perturbations
In general, small perturbations in a dynamical system can have major effects in its outcome, cf.
[60,48] or [46] among many others. To study the behavior of the currently used Q-learning dynamics
in equation (10) in response to such perturbations, we consider a state-dependent noise term  (x)
Ûx = x (1 − x)
[
2x − 1 − γ − T ln
( x
1 − x
)
+  (x)
]
, for x ∈ (0, 1) . (12)
Similarly to equation (11), it will be convenient to introduce the following notation.
Notation 3. For fixed γ ∈ (0, 1) and T ≥ 0, let
f (x;T, γ) := 2x − 1 − γ − T ln
( x
1 − x
)
+  (x) , for x ∈ (0, 1) . (13)
where  (x) : (0, 1) → R is a noise-function that depends on the current population state and which
for all x ∈ (0, 1) satisfies | (x) | ≤ 0 for some constant 0 ∈ (0,min {γ, 1 − γ}). In particular,
f (x;T, γ) := f (x;T, γ)+  (x), where f (x;T, γ) is defined in equation (11). Whenever obvious from
the context, we will omit the dependence on T, γ and write f (x).
The bound 0 is naturally imposed by the requirement that the game parameter, γ, should remain
within its admissible region. In particular, the bound 0 ∈ (0,min {γ, 1 − γ}) on | (x) | ensures that
the perturbation (noise) is not large enough to change the nature of the system in favor of the originally
undesirable equilibrium.
Turning to the dynamics of the  (x)-perturbed system, the number of interior steady states of
the dynamics, as expressed by the roots of f (x;T, γ), may change significantly in comparison to the
unperturbed system. To see this, assume that x∗ is a steady state of the unperturbed system for some
T > 0, so that f (x∗;T, γ) = 0. Then
f (x∗;T, γ) =  (x∗)
and hence, there exists a local neighborhood around x∗ for which the behavior of the system is
essentially determined by the noise term. Accordingly, Ûx may have an arbitrary number of sign-
changes in this neighborhood depending on the exact shape of  (x) and hence, it is not possible to
argue about the exact state of the system within this region. However, we can still reason about the
stability of the system outside these (bounded) neighborhoods in the same fashion as we did for the
unperturbed system. In fact, the stability analysis, cf. Theorem 1 and Figure 3, carry over with the
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only difference that the system will now stabilize within a neighborhood of the initial QRE, i.e., of the
QRE of the unperturbed system. This allows us to establish equivalent convergence guarantees and
retain the desirable effect of the proposed catastrophe mechanism. This is formalized in Theorem 3
whose proof can be found in Appendix D.1.
Theorem 3 (Catastrophe mechanism under bounded perturbations.). For a fixed cost parameter
γ ∈ (0, 1) consider the population game (G1), the revision protocol (S1) and the perturbed resulting
dynamics in equation (12), where | (x) | ≤ 0 ∈ (0,min {γ, 1 − γ}) is a state-dependent noise term
for all x ∈ (0, 1). Then, the catastrophe mechanism of Theorem 2 still applies.
In particular, for any initial population state x0 ∈ [(1 + γ) /2, 1], there exists a finite sequence
〈T0,T1, . . . ,Tn〉 of control parameter values with T0 = Tn = 0, and maxi≤n Ti > Tc (γ − 0), so that
the iterative procedure which, starting from phase i = 0,
– scales the control parameter T to Ti,
– allows the system to converge to a neighborhood of the QRE, x∗ (Ti), of the unperturbed system,
and reiterates for phase i + 1, generates a sequence of population states (QRE) that converges to the
risk-dominant equilibrium, x∗ (Tn) = 0, at which the population adopts the efficient technology.
Theorem 3 suggests that the results of the unperturbed case, largely carry over also to the perturbed
case. Intuitively, while the exact number of steady states in the perturbed system cannot be determined,
the new steady states are all located in some bounded neighborhood of the old steady states. 7 Outside
these regions, the sign of Ûx remains the same as in the unperturbed case and hence, the dynamics
converge to these regions in the same fashion that they converged to the exact steady states in the
unperturbed case. Two illustrations — of bounded and unbounded state dependent perturbations —
are given in Figure 5.
Remark 3. From the perspective of mechanism design, it is also meaningful to study the effects of
the perturbation on the implementation of the proposed mechanism and in particular, on the control
that needs to be exercised on T . To quantify this change, we solve equation f (x) = 0 for T , cf.
Remark 1, and recover the control parameter as a function of x on the geometric locus of all QRE of
the unperturbed system
T (x; γ) = (2x − 1 − γ) /ln
( x
1 − x
)
.
Similarly, if T (x; γ) denotes the value of the control parameter on the geometric locus of all QRE of
the perturbed system, then
T (x; γ) = 2x − 1 − γ +  (x)ln ( x1−x ) = T (x; γ) +  (x)ln ( x1−x ) (14)
which implies that if some x ∈ (0, 1) is a QRE of both systems, then
|T (x; γ) − T (x; γ) | ≤ 0 ·
ln ( 1x − 1)−1 . (15)
Equation (15) highlights an important property that comes from the inclusion of the entropy term in
the dynamics. Namely, as x approaches the boundary for decreasing T > 0, the effect of any bounded
perturbation on the control variable gets increasingly dominated by the entropy term. At T = 0,
the system stabilizes again at x = 0. An illustration is given in Figure 5. Finally, for an alternative
bound on the maximum additional control that needs to be exercised on T to trigger the critical phase
transition, equation (14) and the monotonicity of the critical level Tc (γ) in γ, cf. Corollary 1, imply
that Tc (γ; ) ≤ Tc (γ − 0), where Tc (γ; ) denotes the critical value in the perturbed system (cf.
Theorem 3).
7 The exact size of these neighborhoods depends on the value of  (x) at x ∈ (0, 1). However, it can be shown that these
neighborhoods shrink for values of x close to the boundary or for values of x close to 1/2, cf. Proof of Theorem 3 in
Appendix C.1 and Figure 5 for an illustration.
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Fig. 5: QRE (red lines) of the unperturbed system for γ = 0.08 and QRE (blue dots) under state-
dependent perturbations  (x) = 0.01 + rand · x1/6 (1 − x) (left panel) and  (x) = −rand · ln(x − x0.5)
(right panel), where rand denotes a random number in [0, 0.1]. In both panels, the largest deviations
occur for population states close to 1/2, cf. equation (15), whereas for values of x close to the
boundaries, the perturbed systems reduce to the original system (red line) as the perturbations get
dominated by the entropy term. In the left panel, which satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3,
the proposed mechanism can be implemented with the only difference that, now, the dynamics can
converge to any blue dot (instead of the red line) that lies in a neighborhood of the original QRE (in the
unperturbed system). By contrast, the perturbation in the right panel does not satisfy the assumptions
and the outcome of the mechanism is ambiguous as the population may not transition to states below
1/2 even for large values of the control parameter T .
A.2 Intensity of Network Effects
Parameter α in Equation (2) captures the intensity of the network effects, i.e., the value that can be
created by each technology as a function of its adoption by the population of investors. Values of
α < 1 indicate subadditive value, i.e., that the population payoff is maximized when the network splits
between the two technologies, and fall out of the present scope. Similarly, when α = 1, the degree
of adoption does not affect the generated value and the efficient technology constitutes a dominant
strategy which trivializes the resolution of the game.
In the present context, we are interested in cases with superadditive value — or direct positive
network effects — that are expressed by values of α > 1 (an illustration is provided in Remark 6).
Thus far, we have assumed that α = 2 mainly for expositional purposes, however, in this part, we
show that the results generalize essentially unaltered to any α > 1.
Specifically, let α > 1. Then by equations (3) and (8), we otain the relationship
Ûx = x (1 − x)
[
VKα−1xα−1 − γ − VKα−1 (1 − x)α−1 − T ln
( x
1 − x
)]
,
which after normalizing VKα−1 to 1 — or equivalently after dividing the equation with VKα−1 and
setting γ → γ/VKα−1 and T → T/VKα−1 — yields the dynamics
Ûx = x (1 − x)
[
xα−1 − γ − (1 − x)α−1 − T ln
( x
1 − x
)]
. (16)
The geometric locus of the steady states (QRE) of the dynamics in equation (16) is illustrated for
various values of α > 1 and T ≥ 0 in Figure 6. As network effects become more intense, i.e., as α
increases, splits of the population become increasingly detrimental for both aggregate and individual
welfare. As a consequence, the system becomes more sensitive to the control T and the inefficient
equilibrium is easier to destabilize. This can be seen from the thinning upper component in the QRE
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surface in the left panel of Figure 6. Moreover, for higher values of α, the lower component of the QRE
correspondence develops an unstable part in the [0, 1/2] region (dashed part in the red and green lines
in the left panel and horn-shaped dark area in the right panel) at which the population may oscillate
between three or marginally two QRE. However, all these QRE lie in the attracting region of x = 0
for T = 0 and hence, this instability does not compromise the outcome of the proposed catastrophe
mechanism. In particular, wheneverT ≥ 1/2, there exists a unique QRE x∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) (light area in the
right panel). This implies that by increasing T to (at most) 1/2, the system can be stabilized in a state
x∗ which lies in the attracting region of the desired equilibrium x = 0. Subsequently, the last phase
— at which the control parameter is reset back to 0 — of the proposed catastrophe mechanism in
Theorem 2 can be applied unaltered (e.g., by reducing T back to 0) and still yield the desired outcome
of convergence to the x = 0 equilibrium, independently of the intensity of the network effects, i.e., of
the value of α > 1. This is formalized in Theorem 4.
Fig. 6: Left panel: the QRE correspondence for various values of α (γ = 0.2 is fixed). The case
α = 2 (blue slice) has been treated in Section 4. As α increases, the lower component of the QRE
correspondence develops an unstable region which can be seen as an s-shaped dashed part in the
green slice (left panel). Right panel: the projection of the QRE surface on the (α,T) plane. Darker
areas correspond to parameter values with more QRE. In particular, the bifurcations between one and
three QRE occur at the boundary between dark and light areas at which the system has two QRE. The
parameter range with three QRE that develops for larger values of α can be seen as a dark horn-shaped
area in the upper/upper left part of the graph. For certain parameter values, there exist more QRE both
in the upper and in the lower component of the QRE surface (darker area at which the two initially
dark areas overlap). This unstable area is inconsequential in the transition to the efficient technology
since it lies entirely in the attracting region of the x = 0 equilibrium, cf. Theorem 4. Finally, it can
be seen that Tc (γ) is decreasing in α for values of alpha larger than approximately 2.5 and that the
bound T ≥ 1/2 is (in all cases) particularly conservative.
Theorem 4 (Catastrophe mechanism for arbitrary network effects). For a fixed cost parameter
γ ∈ (0, 1) consider the population game defined by the payoff functions in equation (3) and the revision
protocol (S1) which together lead to the population evolutionary dynamics Ûx in equation (16). Then,
for any α > 1, the catastrophe mechanism of Theorem 2 still applies.
In particular, for any initial population state x0 ∈ [(1 + γ) /2, 1], there exists a finite sequence
〈T0,T1, . . . ,Tn〉 of control parameter values with T0 = Tn = 0, and maxi≤n Ti ≥ 1/2(> Tc (γ)), so that
the iterative procedure which, starting from phase i = 0,
– scales the control parameter T to Ti,
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– allows the system to converge to a QRE, x∗ (Ti),
and reiterates for phase i + 1, generates a sequence of population states (QRE) that converges to the
risk-dominant equilibrium, x∗ (Tn) = 0, at which the population adopts the efficient technology.
Remark 4. As mentioned above, the only difference in comparison to Theorem 2 is that there exists
a critical value αc, so that for values α > αc, there exist multiple QRE in the interval x ∈ (0, 1/2)
for certain values of T < 1/2, cf. Figure 6.8 In practice, the bound T = 1/2 — to obtain a unique
QRE, x∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) — is extremely conservative, and essentially, it is only tight for the absolutely
extreme cases of γ close to 0 and α = 1 (not depicted here). Moreover, since convergence to any QRE
x∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) suffices to move the system out of the inefficient lock-in, Theorem 4 can be equivalently
stated for maxi≤n Ti ≥ Tc (γ) without compromising its outcome.
From the perspective of policy-making, it is also worth noting that the case α = 2 that was used
up to now corresponds to one of the costliest cases to treat in practice. As can be seen in the right
panel of Figure 6, the critical level Tc at which the bifurcation in the upper part of the QRE surface
occurs — i.e., the point at which the two upper QRE merge and immediately thereafter, disappear
— is decreasing in α for values of α larger than approximately 2.5 (protrusion of the dark blue area
in the bottom left corner). In particular, larger values of α capture technologies with more intense
(positive) network effects. The more intense effects translate to smaller values of the tipping point
Tc (γ), which, in turn, implies a lower cost to implement the proposed mechanism.
B Application: Proof of Work Blockchain Mining and Taxation
Since the launch of Bitcoin (BTC) by the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, [45], Proof of Work
(PoW) blockchains and their applications — most notably cryptocurrencies — have taken the world
by storm. Widely considered as a revolutionary technology, blockchains have attracted the attention
of institutions, technology-corporations, investors and academics. In these networks, self-interested
miners ensure the proper functionality of the supported applications by exerting effort and receiving
monetary incentives in return [36]. To participate, and without any centralized authority to grant
permission,miners are required to provide evidence of some predefined, and typically scarce, resource,
e.g., computational power that utilizes electricity in Proof of Work (PoW) protocols, [21,25], or units
of the native cryptocurrency in Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols [10].
Yet, PoW blockchains networks grow orthogonal to their design philosophy in terms of their
environmental footprint. Currently, one BTC transaction wastes as much energy — in terms of
carbon footprint — as 775.818 VISA transactions [19]. More alarming than its current levels —
which rank the BTC network above Finland and Pakistan in terms of electricity consumption — is
the consumption’s increasing trend: the electricity used by the BTC network approximately doubles
every year [64]. The total figures only get worse, if we account for all other PoW blockchains such as
Ethereum [11].
These alarming figures call for mechanisms to accelerate the development and, more crucially,
the adoption of alternative technologies such as (PoS) [10,27], also known as virtual mining [6].10
Yet, an important barrier is that the value of a cryptocurrency — or in general the reliability of
its applications — depends on the size of its mining network (with larger network implying higher
safety). More mining power implies that it is more costly for a potential attacker to gather the required
resources and compromise the functionality of the blockchain, [32,10]. Hence, when the rest of the
8 Technically, this is another bifurcation in the number of QRE, this time caused by parameter α. However, we do not
further explore this bifurcation since this deviates from the scope of the current section.
9 Interestingly, the subsequent (extreme) fluctuations of the CEBCI index within 2020 co-occur with the global COVID-19
disease outbreak.
10 Both from theoretical and practical perspective, PoS technologies have shown to offer strong guarantees analogous to
those of PoW [33,24,11].
Catastrophe by Design in Population Games 23
12/2014 04/2016 08/2017 01/2019 05/2020
0
20
40
60
80
Year
A
n
n
u
al
is
ed
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
b
y
B
T
C
(i
n
T
W
h
)
Bitcoin
Fig. 7: The Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index (CEBCI) showing the estimate of the
mean energy consumption of the Bitcoin (BTC) network in TWh (annualized). From less than 20
TWh in August of 2017, the total network consumption exceeded 90 TWh during the first days into
2020.9Subsequent fluctuations can be To understand the extent to which these figures potentially
underestimate future energy consumption, they still reflect a time point in which BTC has not been
widely endorsed by governments and public institutions and they do not account for the numerous
PoW cryptocurrencies beyond BTC. Source: CBECI by University of Cambridge, Judge Business
School.
population mines a specific PoW cryptocurrency, then it is individually rational (preferable) for any
single miner to also mine that cryptocurrency.
To foster the transition to the existing sustainable alternatives, like PoS, using the currently
developed framework, the control parameter T ≥ 0 can be interpreted as taxation11. As mentioned in
Section 1, changes in T are essentially equivalent to rescaling agents’ utilities. Importantly, taxation
does not have to be neither preferential, i.e., to be imposed only on PoW networks, nor permanent. By
taxing transactions between (all) cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies, central authorities— especially
in countries like China where most mining rigs are concentrated — can influence the transition of
the growing PoW networks to the PoS technology (or any other desirable alternative with equivalent
technological guarantees). Importantly, our work shows that it suffices to (i) exercise a temporary
influence to the system and (ii) to only reach a critical mass of adopters of PoS that is well below the
simple majority before the critical phase transition becomes permanent.
Finally, our auxiliary results concerning the functional relationship between the critical value,
Tc (γ), and the cost parameter, γ, cf. Corollary 1, suggest that temporary shocks in the electricity price
would accelerate the effects of the transition mechanism. Specifically, since Tc (γ) decreases in γ, an
increase in the electricity price for PoW mining would sooner prompt the critical phase transition
of the population to the alternative technology. These results, extrapolated to similar technological
dilemmas — CO2 emitting vs electric (or generally environmentally friendly) vehicles, e.g., cars or
aircrafts or sustainable urban planning — provide an enhanced, and provably effective, toolbox in the
hands of contemporary policymakers.
11 Earlier interpretations of T as taxation parameter can be found in [67] and [68] among others.
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C Appendix
C.1 Additional Material and Omitted Proofs: Section 2
Remark 5 (Derivation of revision protocol (S1)). For gameswith general action sets A = {1, 2, . . . , n},
i.e., with possibly more than two strategies, the Q-learning agents update their strategies according to
the following rule
max
n∑
j=1
xjQt ( j) − T
n∑
j=1
xj ln xj
subject to:
n∑
j=1
xj = 1 (S1’)
xj ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In the current setting, at which each agent has two strategies, this conveniently reduces to the one-
dimensional maximization problem in Equation (S1). To intuitively explain the objective function in
(S1’), observe that the first term, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 xjQt ( j) enforces maximization of the Q-values. Since it
is linear in the xj’s, it would simply choose (put full probability on) the strategy with the highest Q-
value, if the second term (entropy) was missing. However, the introduction of the entropy term, i.e., of
−∑nj=1 xj ln xj , essentially requires from the agent to choose the distribution x with maximum entropy
for every given weighted sum of the Q-values, and hence, to explore (assign positive probability to)
sub-optimal strategies.
The relative importance between maximization of Q-values and exploration of the strategy space is
controlled by parameter T ≥ 0. Termed temperature in physics, T can be interpreted as a tuning
parameter: as T → 0, the agent always acts greedily and chooses the strategy corresponding to the
maximumQâĂŞvalue (pure exploitation), whereas asT →∞, the agent chooses a strategy completely
at random (pure exploration). In particular, for T = 0, the system reduces to the well-known replicator
(best response) dynamics which (under standard regularity assumptions that are met in the present
model) recover the Nash equilibria of the underlying evolutionary game, cf. Section 2.1. For different
values of T > 0, the resting points of the system change— sometimes in an abrupt way in response to
smooth changes in T — and this is precisely the intuition that we exploit here to design a mechanism
that will stabilize the system and move it out of a lock-in to a desirable state. In fact, as shown in
[68], the temperature can be considered as a control parameter in the arsenal of a system designer.
From the objective function, one discerns that parameter T essentially rescales all the Q-values in a
multiplicative way. Hence, as shown in [68], T can be treated as a taxation parameter in economic
systems or as a medically controlled substance in health related settings. The interpretation of T in a
concrete application is further elaborated in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 1. The resulting game
P =
( W S
W 1 − γ −γ
S 0 1
)
.
with γ ∈ (0, 1) has three Nash equilibria: two pure, (W,W) with payoffs (1 − γ, 1 − γ) and (S, S)
with payoffs (1, 1), and one (fully) mixed
((
1+γ
2 ,
1−γ
2
)
,
(
1+γ
2 ,
1−γ
2
))
with payoffs
(
1−γ
2 ,
1−γ
2
)
. These
correspond to population states x1 = 0, x2 = 1+γ2 , and x3 = 1. The corresponding payoffs can be also
derived by substituting in the average payoff function, (4), which here becomes
u¯ (x) = 2x2 − (2 + γ) x + 1.
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All three Nash equilibria are symmetric. The (S, S) (bottom right) Nash equilibrium is (strictly) payoff
dominant, i.e., itPareto-dominates the other two (recall that γ ∈ (0, 1) is the cost from the current costly
technology) and is also (strictly) risk dominant, since 0 + 1 > 1 − 2γ for any γ ∈ (0, 1). Additionally,
both pure strategy equilibria are evolutionary stable, since u (W,W) = 1 − γ > 0 = u (S,W), and
u (S, S) = 1 > −γ = u (W, S). A symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium (x∗, x∗) is evolutionary stable if
u (x∗, x) > u (x, x) for all other mixed strategies x , x∗. Hence, the mixed Nash equilibrium is not
evolutionary stable, since for any other x ∈ (0, 1) with x , 1+γ2
u
(
1 + γ
2
, x
)
− u (x, x) =
(
1 + γ
2
− x
)
[(1 − γ) x + (−γ) (1 − x)] +
(
1 − γ
2
− (1 − x)
)
(1 − x)
= −1
2
(2x − (1 + γ))2 < 0.
C.2 Omitted Proofs: Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. From (3) and (8), it follows directly that
Ûx = x
[
u (W, x) − u¯ (x) + T
(
x ln
( x
x
)
+ (1 − x) ln
(
1 − x
x
))]
= x
[
(1 − x) [u (W, x) − u (S, x)] + T (1 − x) ln
(
1 − x
x
)]
= x (1 − x)
[
u (W, x) − u (S, x) + T ln
(
1 − x
x
)]
= x (1 − x)
[
2x − (1 + γ) − T ln
( x
1 − x
)]
.
Lemma 2. Let T [0, 1/2]. Then, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), the equation
√
1 − 2T − γ − T · ln
(
1 +
√
1 − 2T
1 − √1 − 2T
)
= 0 (17)
has a unique solution Tc (γ) or simply Tc ∈ (0, 1/2).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let u :=
√
1 − 2T . Then,T ∈ [0, 1/2] implies that u ∈ [0, 1) and the transformation
is one to one with inverse T = 12
(
1 − u2) . Hence, we need to show that the function
gγ (u) := u − γ − 1 − u
2
2
ln
(
1 + u
1 − u
)
has a unique root uc in (0, 1), so thatTc (γ) = 12
(
1 − u2c
)
. Note that gγ (u) is defined for any u ∈ (−1, 1).
The derivative of gγ (u) with respect to u is
d
du
gγ (u) = u ln
(
1 + u
1 − u
)
≥ 0
for all u ∈ (−1, 1) with g (u) = 0 only for u = 0. Hence, gγ (u) is strictly increasing with
limu→−1+ gγ (u) = −1 + γ < 0, gγ (0) = 0 − γ < 0 and limu→1− gγ (u) = 1 − γ > 0. Accord-
ingly gγ (u) has precisely one root, uc ∈ (0, 1) which yields the unique solution of the equation in the
statement of Lemma Lemma 2, given by Tc (γ) = 12
(
1 − u2c
) ∈ (0, 1/2).
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Lemma 3. Let γ ∈ (0, 1) and let Tc (γ) ∈ (0, 1/2) as given by Lemma 2. Then, the number of the
solutions of the equation f (x;T, γ) = 0 with
f (x;T, γ) = 2x − (1 + γ) − T ln
( x
1 − x
)
depends on the relative value of T > 0 to Tc (γ) as follows
– 0 < T < Tc (γ): there are 3 solutions x1, x2, x3, with x1 ∈ (0, xl), x2 ∈ ((1 + γ) /2, xu) and
x3 ∈ (xu, 1), with xu,l as in (2). Moreover, it holds that 0 < xl < 1/2 < (1 + γ) /2 < xu < 1.
– T = Tc (γ): there are 2 solutions x1, x2, with x1 ∈ (0, xl) and x2 = xu, with xl < 1/2 and
xu > (1 + γ) /2.
– T > Tc (γ): there is 1 solution x1, with x1 ∈ (0, xl), with xl < 1/2 when T < 1/2 and x1 ∈ (0, 1/2)
when T ≥ 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 3. For any T > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1), the function f (x;T, γ) is continuous in x ∈ (0, 1)
with
lim
x→0+
f (x) = +∞, lim
x→1−
f (x;T, γ) = −∞,
f (1/2) = −γ, f ((1 + γ) /2) = −T ln
(
1 + γ
1 − γ
)
< 0. (18)
This implies that f (x;T, γ) starts positive and ends up negative. The derivative of f (x;T, γ) with
respect to x ∈ (0, 1) is f ′ (x;T, γ) = 2− Tx(1−x) , with f ′ (x;T, γ) = 0, if and only if −2x2 + 2x −T = 0.
If T > 1/2, then f ′ (x;T, γ) > 0 for any x ∈ (0, 1). For T < 1/2, there exist two critical points
xl,u (T) = 12
(
1 ±
√
1 − 2T
)
.
and for T = 1/2 only one, i.e., xl = xu = 1/2. Depending on the value of T relative to Tc (γ), there
are three cases for the number of the solutions of the equation f (x;T, γ) = 0 for x ∈ (0, 1).
– 0 < T < Tc (γ). Since Tc (γ) < 1/2 for any γ ∈ (0, 1) as shown in Lemma 2, we have for any
T ∈ (0,Tc (γ)) by equation (17) that
xu (T) = 12
(
1 +
√
1 − 2T
)
>
1
2
(
1 +
√
1 − 2Tc (γ)
)
=
1
2
(
1 + γ + Tc (γ) ln
(
1 +
√
1 − 2Tc (γ)
1 − √1 − 2Tc (γ)
))
>
1
2
(1 + γ) .
Moreover, it also immediate that 1 − 2T > 0 and, hence that 0 < xl < 1/2 which shows that
0 < xl < 1/2 < (1 + γ) /< xu < 1 as claimed. Also, by the strict monotonicity of gγ (u) ∈ (−1, 1)
that was shown in the proof of Lemma 2, we have that
f (xl;T, γ) = gγ
(
−
√
1 − 2T
)
< gγ (0) < 0,
f (xu;T, γ) = gγ
(√
1 − 2T
)
> gγ
(√
1 − 2Tc (γ)
)
= 0.
Hence, using equations (18) and the sign of f ′ (x;T, γ), we obtain that f (x;T, γ) has precisely
one root x1 ∈ (0, xl), one root x2 ∈ ((1 + γ) /2, xu) and one root x3 ∈ (xu, 1).
– T = Tc (γ). As in the previous case, Tc (γ) < 1/2 which by the same reasoning implies that
0 < xl < (1 + γ) /2 < xu < 1. However, in this case, f (xu;T, γ) = gγ
(√
1 − 2Tc (γ)
)
= 0 and
hence, using again equations (18) and the sign of f ′ (x;T, γ), it follows that f has one root in
(0, x1), and a second root in ((1 + γ) /2, 1) which is precisely xu.
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– T > Tc (γ). In this case,
f (xu;T, γ) = gγ
(√
1 − 2T
)
< gγ
(√
1 − 2Tc (γ)
)
= 0
which implies that f (x;T, γ) turns negative at some point x1 < xl when T < 1/2 or x1 < 1/2
when T > 1/2 (at which case xl does not exist) and remains negative thereafter since x2 is a local
maximum. Hence, this x1 ∈ (0, xl) or x1 ∈ (0, 1/2) is the unique root of f (x;T, γ) in (0, 1).
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Fig. 8: The function f (x;T, γ) for γ = 0.185 and T = 0.25,T = Tc (γ) ≈ 0.3 and T = 1. For
T < Tc (γ), there are three steady states (roots of f (x;T, γ)), for T = Tc (γ), there are precisely
2, and for T > Tc (γ), only one. The smallest root is always less than 1/2 (in particular less than
xl = 12
(
1 − √1 − 2T
)
, if xl exists), whereas the remaining ones (if any) are larger than (1 + γ) /2.
The three cases of Lemma 3 are illustrated in Figure 8. In the depicted instantiation, γ = 0.185
which yields Tc (γ) ≈ 0.3. The three curves correspond to T = 0.25,T = Tc (γ) and T = 1 which, in
agreement with Lemma 3, yield 3, 2 and 1 solutions respectively to the equation f (x;T, γ) = 0, x ∈
(0, 1).
Using Lemmas 2 and 3, we can now determine the convergence properties of the Q-learning
dynamical system Ûx and hence, prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The existence of the steady states in the three cases has been established in
Lemma 3. Hence, it remains to prove the claims about their stability. The dynamics defined by Ûx
are 1-dimensional and hence their convergence properties and the stability of their steady states can
be fully determined by the sign of Ûx. Since x (1 − x) > 0 for any x ∈ (0, 1), the sign of Ûx fully
depends on f (x;T, γ). In turn, the sign of f (x;T, γ) for any x ∈ (0, 1) has already been determined
by the calculations in the proof of Lemma 3 and in particular by equation (18). Formally, we have the
following cases
– T < Tc (γ). In this case, the dynamics Ûx have three steady states x1, x2, x3 ∈ (0, 1) that correspond
to the respective roots of function f (x;T, γ). In particular, it holds that 0 < x1 < xl < 1/2 <
(1 + γ) /2 < x2 < xu < x3 < 1 and the sign of Ûx starts positive and alternates accordingly. This
gives the stability results in Figure 3b.
– T = Tc (γ). At this point, the two roots that are larger than 1/2, namely x2 and x3, merge to one root
precisely at xu. The critical observation is that this new steady state is unstable, since the dynamics
Ûx have a negative sign at both sides of the root xu. Moreover, it holds that xu > (1 + γ) /2. This
is shown in Figure 3c.
– T > Tc (γ). In this case, f ′ (x;T, γ) < 0 which implies that the dynamics Ûx are decreasing for any
x (0, 1). Since f (x;T, γ) starts positive and ends up negative, there remains only one root (steady
state), x1 of f (x;T, γ), which is strictly less than 1/2. An illustration is given in Figure 3d.
28 S. Leonardos et. al
Fig. 9: An instantiation of the stability analysis of Theorem 1 for γ = 0.1 and all T ∈ [0, 1] (for values
of T ≥ 1, the results are similar). The blue line represents the geometric locus of the QRE. Solid
segments correspond to stable and dashed segments to unstable equilibria. This illustration can be
compared to the stability analysis in Figure 3.
Proof of Corollary 1. For γ ∈ (0, 1), the critical temperature Tc (γ) is the unique solution of the
equation
√
1 − 2T − γ − T · ln
(
1 +
√
1 − 2T
1 − √1 − 2T
)
= 0,
in (0, 1/2), cf. Lemma 2. To proceed, let F (γ,T) := √1 − 2T − γ − T · ln
(
1+
√
1−2T
1−√1−2T
)
. Implicit
differentiation of the function F (γ,T) = 0 with respect to γ, yields
0 =
∂F (γ,T)
∂γ
+
∂F (γ,T)
∂T
· dT
dγ
= −1 − ln
(
1 +
√
1 − 2T
1 − √1 − 2T
)
· dT
dγ
Hence
dT
dγ
= −
(
ln
(
1 +
√
1 − 2T
1 − √1 − 2T
))−1
which is negative, since the argument of the ln is larger than 1 for all T ∈ (0, 1/2].
C.3 Omitted Materials: Section 5
Proof of Theorem 2. As mentioned in Remark 2, in theory it suffices to select 〈T0 = 0,T1 >
Tc (γ) ,T2 = 0〉. Then, the stability properties of the dynamics that were established in Theorem 1
directly imply the result. For practical purposes though, only gradual changes in T may be possible.
However, we can show that the mechanism still results in the same outcome. Specifically, start-
ing from any initial point x0 ∈ [(1 + γ) /2, 1] and increasing T from T0 = 0 to a T1 ∈ (0,Tc (γ)),
the dynamics will stabilize at QRE x3. Further increasing T above Tc (γ) will lead the dynam-
ics to stabilize at the unique remaining QRE, x∗1 (T) < 1/2. It remains to show that we can re-
duce T back to 0 and converge to the desired equilibrium x = 0. By Lemma 3, the function
f (x;T, γ) = 2x − 1 − γ − T ln ( x1−x ) has precisely one root x1 (T) in (0, xl (T)) for any value of
0 < T ≤ Tc (γ) < 1/2, where xl (T) = 12
(
1 − √1 − 2T
)
. Moreover, implicit differentiation of the
function f (x,T) = 0, with f (x,T) := 2x (T) − 1 − γ − T ln
(
x(T )
1−x(T )
)
, shows that x (T) is strictly
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increasing in T for x < 1/2, since
∂ f (x,T)
∂T
dx
dT
+
∂ f (x,T)
∂x
dx
dT
= − ln
( x
1 − x
)
+
(
2 − x
1 − x
) dx
dT
= 0
which yields
dx
dT
=
ln
(
x
1−x
)
2 − Tx(1−x)
> 0
for x < xl (T) and T < Tc (γ) < 1/2. Hence, 0 < x1 (T) < xl (T) implies that for any  > 0, there
exists a δ > 0 such that x1 (T) <  for any T < δ, since
lim
T→0+
xl = lim
T→0+
1
2
(
1 −
√
1 − 2T
)
= 0
This implies, that x1 (T) → 0 as T → 0+, which concludes the proof.
An alternative visualization of the control catastrophe mechanism described in Section 5 is
provided in Figure 10.
Fig. 10: The process of destabilizing an equilibrium via a controlled catastrophe and hysteresis
mechanism in the game (G1). The first panel shows the evolution of the population state for 10 initial
starting points and control parameter T = 0. The Q-learning dynamics – in this case, equivalent to
the replicator dynamics – converge to the two stable equilibria of the system. The only trajectory that
converges to the mixed, unstable equilibrium is the one that precisely starts from it (horizontal line at
(1 + γ) /2, i.e., slightly above 1/2). In the second panel, the control parameter increases (but remains
below the critical level). The starting points are the possible steady states for T = 0. The two stable
equilibria (QRE) are in the interior of the admissible region, x ∈ (0, 1). There is a third unstable
equilibrium that separates the attracting regions of the two equilibria (not visible since no trajectory
converges to it). In the third panel, the control parameter is increased above the critical level. Starting
again from the endpoints of the previous panel, the stability of the system changes abruptly: the
upper and middle equilibria merge and annihilate each other. There is only one remaining equilibrium
and the population converges to it independently of the starting point. This equilibrium lies in the
attracting region of the efficient technology (risk-dominant equilibrium), which can be now recovered
by resetting the system back to its initial control value, T = 0 (last panel).
D Appendix
D.1 Omitted Materials and Proofs: Appendix A.1
Lemma 4. Let f (x; γ,T) as in Notation 1 and let f (x;T, γ) := f (x;T, γ)+ (x)where  (x) denotes
a noise term defined for x (0, 1) such that | (x) | ≤ 0 for some 0 ∈ (0,min {γ, 1 − γ}). Then, it holds
that
f (x;T, γ + 0) < f (x;T, γ) < f (x;T, γ − 0)
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Proof. Since ∂∂γ f (x;T, γ) = −1 < 0, f (x;T, γ) is decreasing in γ which implies that
f (x;T, γ + 0) < f (x;T, γ) +  (x) = f (x;T, γ) < f (x;T, γ − 0) .
Notation 4. For given γ ∈ (0, 1) and any T > 0, let x∗m (T) := min {x ∈ (0, 1) : f (x;T, γ) = 0} and
x∗m (T ; 0) := min {x ∈ (0, 1) : f (x;T, γ) = 0} denote the minimumQRE at levelT of the unperturbed
and perturbed dynamics, respectively. Note that by Theorem 1, x∗ (T ; γ) < 1/2 for any pair (T, γ).
Proof of Theorem 3. The stability analysis of the dynamics in the perturbed case is derived in the
same way as in Theorem 1 and follows directly from Lemma 4 and the fact that | (x) | ≤ 0. In
particular, let x∗ ∈ (0, 1) be a QRE of the unperturbed system. Then, since | (x) | ≤ 0, we can found
a δ (x∗) > 0, so that | f (x∗ ± δ (x∗) ; γ,T) | > 0. Hence, outside the δ (x∗)-neighborhood of x∗, the
function f (x; γ,T) retains the sign of the unperturbed function f (x;T, γ) and the stability property
of the dynamics directly follow from Theorem 1.
To obtain an estimate of δ (x∗), observe that for any x ∈ (0, 1), by first order Taylor’s theorem, we
have that
f (x∗ ± δ;T, γ) = f (x∗;T, γ) ±
(
2 − T 1
ξ (1 − ξ)
)
δ = ±
(
2 − T 1
ξ (1 − ξ)
)
δ,
where ξ ∈ (x∗ − δ, x∗) or ξ ∈ (x∗, x∗ + δ), respectively and δ > 0. This equation can then be solved
to find a minimum value δ (x∗) so that | f (x∗ ± δ (x∗) ;T, γ) ≥ 0. As claimed in Appendix A, the
steep increase, 1x(1−x) , of the entropy term as x
∗ approaches the boundary, dominates the (bounded)
perturbation term  (x∗) and yields lower values of δ (x∗). This implies that the distance between
x∗m (T) and x∗m (T ; 0) as defined in Notation 4 is decreasing for values of x∗m (T) close to 0. Thus,
convergence to x = 0 (which corresponds to the efficient technology) is still achieved.
D.2 Omitted Materials and Proofs: Appendix A.2
Remark 6. Parameter α expresses the value that is created by the technology in response to its
adoption. In particular, there are three interesting cases, depending on whether α is smaller, larger
than or equal to 1.
– α < 1: Subadditive value. In this case, the total value generated from the two technologies is
subadditive implying that a split of the network is more beneficial for the society.
– α = 1: Linear value. In this case, the aggregate value that is generated is increasing in the rate
of adoption of the innovative (less costly) technology. Resolution of this case is trivial from a
mathematical perspective, since the less costly technology constitutes a strictly dominant strategy
for the population for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
– α > 1: Superadditive value. In this case, the aggregate value is (locally) maximized when either
technology is fully adopted. This case corresponds to direct (positive) network effects and is the
one that is discussed in the current paper.
Typical instantiations of these cases are depicted in the two panels of Figure 11.
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on Lemma 5 which exploits a particular inequality of the natural
logarithm.
Lemma 5. For any α ≥ 2, and any x ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
xα (1 − x) + x (1 − x)α ≤ 1
2α
.
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Fig. 11: Aggregate payoff uA (x) created by the population as a whole at population state x ∈ [0, 1]
(investment in technologyW) for various values of parameter α. The aggregate payoff (vertical axis)
is calculated by the formula: uA (x) = VKα
[
xα − γ
VKα−1 x + (1 − x)α
]
, with x ∈ [0, 1] and selected
values of the parameters V = 10,K = 4 and γ = 1. For α = 2 (left panel) and in general for α > 1, the
total aggregate value is (locally) maximized at the boundaries, i.e., when either technology is fully
adopted (superadditive value). The global maximum is attained when the less costly technology S is
fully adopted, i.e., when x = 0. By contrast, for α = 1/2 (right panel, blue line), and in general for
α < 1, the aggregate wealth is maximized when the population is split between the two technologies
(subadditive value). For α = 1 (right panel, red line), the aggregate wealth is increasing in the adoption
of the less costly technology S (linear value).
Proof. Since x ∈ [0, 1], we can rewrite the inequality as
xα (1 − x) + x (1 − x)α ≤ x
2α
+
1 − x
2α
which is equivalent to [
xα (1 − x) − x
2α
]
+
[
x (1 − x)α − 1 − x
2α
]
≤ 0
Hence, by symmetry, it suffices to show that xα (1 − x) − x2α ≤ 0, for any x ∈ [0, 1] and α > 2, which
is in turn equivalent to xα−1 (1 − x) ≤ 12α . By differentiating the left hand side with respect to x, we
find that ddx
(
xα−1 (1 − x)) = xα−2α (α−1α − x) which is zero for x = α−1α . Since xα−1 (1 − x) is equal
to 0 for both x = 0 and x = 1, it attains a maximum at x = α−1α with value
(
α−1
α
)α−1 1
α . Accordingly,
it suffices to show that (
α − 1
α
)α−1 1
α
≤ 1
2α
or equivalently that
(
α−1
α
)α−1 ≤ 1/2 for any α ≥ 2. However, the term on the left side is decreasing
in α, since by taking the logarithm and applying the inequality ln (x) ≤ x − 1, we obtain that
d
dα
ln
(
α − 1
α
)α−1
= ln
(
α − 1
α
)
+
1
α
≤ α − 1
α
− 1 + 1
α
= 0.
Hence, the maximum of the left side is attained for α = 2, yielding a value of
(
2−1
2
)2−1
= 12 , which
concludes the proof.
To ease the proof of Theorem 4, we restrict attention to integer α > 1, yet the results continue
to hold for any α ≥ 1. Recall that for α = 1, the efficient technology constitutes a strictly dominant
strategy and hence its adoption is trivial (and hence, it is excluded from the statement of Theorem 4).
The continuous case requires an additional technical step for the interval (2, 3) and since it does not
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add much intuition, it is omitted. In particular, for α ∈ [2, 3], fα (x) is not monotone decreasing.
However the statement of Theorem 4 continues to hold in this interval as well. Since this case requires
more technical details without providing any additional insight, its proof is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 4. The case α = 2 has been treated in the Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. For α ≥ 3,
γ ∈ (0, 1) and T ≥ 12 , the function fα (x) := xα−1 − (1 − x)α−1 − γ − T ln x1−x is continuous and
satisfies
lim
x→0+
fα(x) = lim
x→0+
(
xα−1 − (1 − x)α−1 − γ − T ln x
1 − x
)
= ∞ and fα
(
1
2
)
= −γ < 0.
Hence, since fα (x) is continuous for x ∈ (0, 1), there exists x∗ ∈ (0, 12 ) such that fα (x∗) = 0. To prove
uniqueness, it will be sufficient to prove that for T ≥ 1/2, fα (x) is decreasing in x. This implies that
for T ≥ 1/2, there is a unique steady state x∗ and hence, the critical temperature Tc will necessarily
satisfy Tc < 1/2. Taking the derivative of fα (x) with respect to x, we obtain
d
dx
fα (x) = (α − 1) xα−2 + (α − 1) (1 − x)α−2 − T 1x (1 − x) .
The last expression is decreasing in T and hence it suffices to prove that ddx fα (x) ≤ 0, for T = 1/2.
In this case, ddx fα (x) ≤ 0 is equivalent to
xα−1 (1 − x) + x (1 − x)α−1 ≤ 1
2 (α − 1)
and the claim follows from Lemma 5. In particular, equality holds only if T = 12 , α = 3 (α − 1 = 2),
and x = 12 . Hence, fα (x) is decreasing in (0, 1) which proves the claim. Finally, we need to show that
for T = 0 and any α > 1, the system still has 3 steady states, x1 = 0, x3 = 1 and x2 ∈ (1/2, 1). For
T = 0, the first derivative of fα (x) with respect to x becomes
d
dx
fα (x) = (α − 1)
[
xα−2 + (1 − x)α−2] > 0
for all x ∈ (0, 1) and all α > 1 which implies that fα (x) is monotonically increasing. Since fα (x)
starts negative at x = 0, ends up positive at x = 1, and fα (1/2) = −γ < 0, it has one root that lies in
(1/2, 1). Hence, the dynamics
Ûx = x (1 − x) [xα−1 − γ − (1 − x)α−1]
have two obvious steady states x1 = 0 and x3 = 1 and a third steady state x2 ∈ (1/2, 1). Accordingly,
for T = 0, the usual stability analysis applies, which proves that [0, 1/2] lies in the attracting region
of x = 0 as claimed.
